Montclair State University

Montclair State University Digital
Commons
Department of Political Science and Law
Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works

Department of Political Science and Law

5-2011

Corruption and confidence in public institutions: Evidence from a
global survey
Bianca Clausen
The World Bank

Aart Kraay
The World Bank

Zsolt Nyiri
nyiriz@montclair.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/polysci-law-facpubs
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Law Commons

MSU Digital Commons Citation
Clausen, Bianca; Kraay, Aart; and Nyiri, Zsolt, "Corruption and confidence in public institutions: Evidence
from a global survey" (2011). Department of Political Science and Law Faculty Scholarship and Creative
Works. 11.
https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/polysci-law-facpubs/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science and Law at Montclair
State University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Political Science and Law
Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works by an authorized administrator of Montclair State University Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@montclair.edu.

Corruption and Confidence in Public Institutions:
Evidence from a Global Survey
Bianca Clausen, Aart Kraay, and Zsolt Nyiri 1

Despite considerable debate over definitions, measurement, and methodology,
it is widely-accepted among academics and policymakers that well-functioning
public institutions play an important role in economic development. In turn, a
key ingredient in the effectiveness of public institutions is the confidence that
they inspire among those whom they serve. For example, households or firms
who do not have confidence in the police or the courts are unlikely to avail
themselves of their services, and may resort to other informal means of property protection or dispute resolution. Similarly, if individuals lack confidence in
the honesty of the electoral process they are unlikely to vote, leading to low
1. Aart Kraay (corresponding author), The World Bank, Development Economics Research Group,
akraay@worldbank.org, Bianca Clausen, The World Bank, Development Economics Research Group,
bclausen@worldbank.org, Zsolt Nyiri, German Marshall Fund, znyiri@gmfus.org. We would like to
thank the Knowledge for Change (KCP) Program of the World Bank for financial support, and Alfonso
Astudillo, Michael Clemens, Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Claudio Raddatz, and seminar participants at
Gallup, the World Bank, and Stanford University. We are also grateful to the Gallup Organization for
enabling this project by providing access to the Gallup World Poll data, and especially to Gale Muller,
Vice Chairman and General Manager of the Gallup World Poll. The views expressed here do not reflect
those of the Gallup Organization, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the World Bank, its
Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
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Well-functioning institutions matter for economic development. In order to operate
effectively, public institutions must also inspire confidence in those they serve. We use
data from the Gallup World Poll, a unique and very large global household survey, to
document a quantitatively large and statistically significant negative correlation
between corruption and confidence in public institutions. This suggests an important
indirect channel through which corruption can inhibit development: by eroding confidence in public institutions. This correlation is robust to the inclusion of a large set of
controls for country and respondent-level characteristics. Moreover we show how it
can plausibly be interpreted as reflecting at least in part a causal effect from corruption to confidence. Finally, we provide evidence that individuals with low confidence
in institutions exhibit low levels of political participation, show increased tolerance
for violent means to achieve political ends, and have a greater desire to “vote with
their feet” through emigration. JEL classification: D73, O12, O17
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2. UNAMA Press Release, United Nations Assistance Mission, August 20, 2008.
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turnout rates that cast doubt on elected officials’ popular mandates and their
ability to carry out their agendas. These effects of corruption on confidence
have not been lost on policymakers. A recent quotation from Kai Eide, UN
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, neatly encapsulates this view: “..[Corruption] pushes people away from the state and undermines our joint efforts to build peace, stability and progress for Afghanistan’s
peoples.” 2
In this paper we empirically investigate the role of corruption in undermining confidence in public institutions. We document a quantitatively large and
statistically significant partial correlation between measures of corruption and
confidence in public institutions using a unique dataset. The Gallup World Poll
(GWP) is a large cross-country household survey, interviewing more than
100,000 households in over 150 countries, annually or biennially in most
countries since 2006. We use questions from the 2008/2009 wave of the GWP,
covering over 78,000 respondents in a single cross-section of 103 countries to
study the links between corruption and confidence in public institutions in
both developed and developing countries. Not surprisingly, in countries where
respondents report a high incidence of personal experiences with corruption,
and in which corruption is perceived to be widespread, confidence in public
institutions is also low. Much more interestingly, we show that this pattern
also holds across individuals within countries: individuals who experience corruption and who report that corruption is widespread also tend to have lower
confidence in public institutions. We show that this correlation is robust to the
inclusion of a large set of variables to control for respondent-level characteristics, including a number of proxies intended to capture the respondent’s tendency to complain or report more negatively on corruption and confidence
than might otherwise be objectively warranted.
Our goal in this paper is not to develop new theoretical understandings of
the links between corruption and confidence in public institutions. Rather, our
much more modest objective is to significantly improve the quality of the existing empirical evidence on the relationship between the two. Relative to the
existing empirical literature on this topic (which we discuss in more detail
below), we offer three important contributions. First and most basic, our study
covers a much larger set of countries and respondents than any previous work,
which due to data limitations typically has been focused on small, usually
regionally-focused samples of countries. Second, several features of the GWP
allow us to include a very rich set of respondent-level control variables, importantly including proxies for respondents’ unobserved propensity to respond
negatively to both questions about corruption and confidence that might artificially bias our results towards finding a strong effect of corruption on
confidence.
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Third and perhaps most important, we offer a more serious treatment of a
key identification problem that has largely been ignored by the existing literature. Simply documenting that survey respondents answer “yes” to a question
like “is corruption a problem in your country” and “no” to a question like
“are you confident in your national government”, as most of the previous literature has done, does little to identify the direction of causation between the
two. Perhaps respondents’ perceptions of the prevalence of corruption drive
their low confidence in institutions, but just as plausibly the opposite could be
true: individuals who lack confidence in public institutions might as a result
express the view that corruption is widespread.
We address concerns about endogeneity in two ways. The first is to exploit
the difference in responses to two questions asked in the GWP. As we discuss
in more detail below, the GWP asks both a generalized perceptions of corruption question, as well as a very specific experiential question which asks
whether the respondent has been asked for a bribe in the past 12 months. The
advantage of the latter question is that it is much more plausibly exogenous to
respondents’ confidence in public institutions since it in large part reflects the
decision of a public official to solicit a bribe from the respondent, rather than
the respondent’s own characteristics. Consistent with this view, we find that
the estimated effect of the experienced corruption question is substantially
smaller and less statistically significant than the corresponding estimated effect
using the generalized perceptions question. However it remains strongly significant and quantitatively large, supporting our claim of an important and plausibly causal effect running from corruption to confidence in public institutions.
Second, as we argue in more detail below, even the partial correlation between
corruption experiences and confidence might reflect some degree of reverse causation from confidence to corruption experiences. To assess this concern, we
also perform a bounds analysis which shows that such reverse causation is unlikely to fully overturn our finding of a significant causal effect of corruption on
confidence.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we review the
related literature. Section II describes the main features of the Gallup World
Poll and compares our key corruption variables with other widely used ones.
Section III contains our main empirical results linking corruption to confidence
in public institutions. In Section IV we explore a number of robustness checks
for this partial correlation, and in Section V we discuss in detail the identification problem and potential solutions. In Section VI we briefly document
some consequences of the corruption-induced loss of confidence in public institutions, showing that individuals with low confidence in public institutions are
less likely to engage in the political process, are more likely to condone violence as a means to further political ends, and are more likely to “vote with
their feet” by emigrating. Section VII concludes.
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It is widely accepted by scholars and policymakers that well-functioning institutions are important for development. This view has been informed by a wide
range of historical analysis, case studies, and cross-country empirical analysis.
A few examples from this very large literature include North (1990), Knack
and Keefer (1995, 1997), Kaufmann et al. (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001), and
Rodrik et al. (2004). The idea that a lack of confidence in public institutions
undermines their effectiveness has also been widely studied. A few examples of
this literature include Easton (1965, 1975), Gibson and Caldeira (1995),
Putnam (2000), Uslaner (2002), Gibson et al. (2003), and Mishler and Rose
(2005). There is also a large literature on the direct economic consequences of
corruption for growth and investment, including Mauro (1995), Knack and
Keefer (1995), Mo (2001), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), and Méon and
Sekkat (2005), and reviewed by Méon and Sekkat (2004) and Lambsdorff
(2007).
Our contribution is to the small but growing literature on the effects of corruption that operate through confidence in public institutions. As our contribution in this paper is primarily empirical, we focus in this review only on the
empirical aspects of previous papers that have studied the links between corruption and confidence in public institutions. We refer the interested reader to
some of these other papers, most notably Anderson and Tverdova (2003), for
an extensive discussion of the various theoretical channels through which corruption might impact confidence in public institutions.
A number of early papers in this literature exploit only the country-level
variation in perceptions of corruption and confidence in public institutions.
These include Pharr (2000) who looks at aggregate data over time for one
country (Japan); Della Porta (2000) who provides a narrative discussion
of country-level averages of both corruption and confidence for just three
countries; and Anderson and Tverdova (2003) who combine country-level data
on corruption perceptions from the Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index with household survey data on confidence from 16 mostly
developed countries. The major drawback of such studies is the possibility that
excluded country characteristics (or year effects in the case of Pharr (2000))
may be confounding the observed relationship between corruption and confidence in public institutions.
A second set of papers improves on these by relying on household-level
variation in survey responses to questions about corruption and confidence to
estimate the correlation between the two. These include Rose, Mishler, and
Haerpfer (1998), Mishler and Rose (2001), Catterberg and Moreno (2005),
and Chang and Chu (2006), who all document a negative partial correlation
between perceptions of corruption and confidence in public institutions in
small and regionally-focused samples of countries. These papers however do
not address the identification problem to which we have referred in the
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3. The identification problem is compounded by the fact that, despite having record-level data for
many countries, Bratton (2007) does not appear to include country fixed effects in his specifications.
This opens the possibility that unobserved country-level effects are confounding the relationship
between corruption and satisfaction with public services that he studies.
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introduction: it is unclear from the partial correlations documented by these
authors whether respondents’ perceptions of corruption drive their confidence
in public institutions, or the converse.
Also in this category is a related paper by Hellman and Kaufmann (2004),
who investigate how an alternative measure of corruption perceptions influences firms’ confidence in, and use of, public institutions. They use data from
the World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey of
6500 firms in transition economies in 2002 to construct a measure of perceived
‘crony bias’ as the difference between firms’ perceptions of their own influence
and the influence of other firms they view as having strong political connections. They show that firms who perceive a great deal of crony bias in policymaking have less confidence in the judiciary, are less likely to use courts, are
more likely to pay bribes, and are more likely to cheat on their taxes. Here as
well, however, the direction of causation between corruption perceptions and
confidence in institutions is unclear.
Four more recent papers improve on the ones discussed so far by relying on
respondent-level data on personal experiences with corruption (and not simply
perceptions of corruption) to study the effects on confidence in public institutions. Seligson (2002) uses survey data for four Latin American countries to
test the effects of corruption experiences on perceptions of the legitimacy of
the political system at the individual level. He finds that exposure to corruption
erodes belief in the political system and reduces interpersonal trust. Bratton
(2007) uses survey data from 18 African countries to document that perceptions of corruption are negatively correlated with respondents’ satisfaction with
public services, but somewhat surprisingly, personal experience with bribery is
positively associated with user satisfaction. These papers share with ours the
advantage of relying on corruption experiences questions which plausibly are
more exogenous than corruption perceptions. However, these papers do not
consider the further possibility we address later in the paper, that even
responses to the corruption experiences question may be endogenous to
responses to the confidence questions.3
Finally, Cho and Kirwin (2007) and Lavallée, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud
(2008) also use a set of African countries covered by the Afrobarometer survey
to investigate directly the links between confidence in public institutions and
both corruption perceptions and corruption experiences questions using
respondent-level variation. Unlike the rest of the literature surveyed so far,
these papers are the only ones to explicitly acknowledge the potential for
reverse causality and seek to address it. Cho and Kirwin (2007) in particular
emphasize the possibility of vicious circles: corruption undermines confidence
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in public institutions, and this in turn increases the acceptability of offering
bribes to obtain public services, increasing the prevalence of corruption.4 Both
papers propose using instrumental variables drawn from the same survey in
order to address this identification problem. However, as we explain in more
detail below in our discussion of identification, this strategy depends on the
validity of – in our view implausible – exclusion restrictions that the authors
fail to adequately justify.
In summary, the existing literature on the effect of corruption on confidence
in public institutions has been based on small samples of countries, and has for
the most part failed to recognize or address the difficulty of isolating the direction of causation between corruption and confidence. In the remainder of this
paper we show how we can use the very large sample size and the richness of
the GWP core questionnaire to make progress on these issues.
AND

CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS
WORLD POLL

IN THE

GALLUP

The Gallup World Poll (GWP) has been fielded annually or biennially since
2006 in over 150 countries representing 95% of the world’s adult population,
and asks questions on a wide range of topics. This makes it the largest (in
terms of country coverage) annual multi-country household survey in the
world. The surveys are based on a standard methodology and considerable
effort goes into ensuring comparability across countries. The surveys are
designed to be nationally representative of people who are 15 years old or
older and great efforts are made to interview households in rural areas, as well
as politically unstable and insecure areas. The surveys are in-depth face-to-face
interviews in all countries except the most developed countries such as Western
Europe or Australia where a shorter version of the survey is fielded by phone.5
The majority of the core questions on the Gallup World Poll are not political
in nature. Instead they concern individuals’ well-being, asking about their everyday lives, level of happiness, life-satisfaction, expectations about their future,
daily experiences of stress, etc.6 This tends to build a higher level of trust
between the interviewer and respondent than a more technical-sounding
4. A related point is made by Sacks (2011) who argues theoretically and empirically that it is
difficult for governments to embark on public sector reform programs absent some measure of public
trust in the government. If in turn poor public sector management leads to corruption which
undermines trust in government, there is the possibility of a “trap” where governments viewed as
corrupt do not have the legitimacy required to carry out reforms that might actually reduce corruption.
5. For documentation of the GWP survey methodology refer to http://www.gallup.com/consulting/
worldpoll/108079/Methodological-Design.aspx
6. In this context, we note that a number of recent scholarly papers have used the GWP data for
empirical research. Examples include Deaton (2008, 2009), Helliwell (2008), Ng et al. (2008),
Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), Deaton et al. (2009), Gandelman and Hernández-Murillo (2009),
Helliwell et al. (2009), Krueger and Malečková (2009), and Pelham et al. (2009). The majority of these
focus on GWP questions related to subjective assessments of personal well-being.
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II. CORRUPTION
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7. However, one should not conclude that all respondents are fully candid in their responses to all
questions. For approaches to identifying reticent respondent biases and applications, see Azfar and
Murrell (2009) and Clausen, Kraay and Murrell (2010).
8. At the time of our access to the data, the relevant corruption questions had been asked only once
in each country, and so we are unfortunately not able to exploit any within-country over-time variation
in the data.
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government-use questionnaire. Together with an explicit statement by the
enumerator regarding the confidentiality of responses, this likely helps to
improve respondent candor on some of the more sensitive questions in the
survey.7
We combine countries from the 2008 and early 2009 waves of the GWP
into a single cross-section of countries8. As our key measure of corruption we
use the following specific question about the respondent’s personal experience
with corruption: “Sometimes people have to give a bribe or present in order to
solve their problems. In the last 12 months, were you, personally, faced with
this kind of situation, or not (regardless of whether you gave a bribe/present)?”
This question, which we will refer to this as the “corruption experiences” question was a new addition to the core GWP questionnaire in the 2008 wave of
surveys. However, for reasons of timing and questionnaire space, it was asked
in only 115 of the 124 countries covered in our sample of the GWP in 2008
and early 2009. This question was asked in most high-income OECD, Latin
American, Asian and African countries, but coverage of Eastern Europe is
scarcer. Nevertheless the breadth of GWP data still allows us to study the
effects of corruption experiences in a much larger sample of countries and
respondents than any previous work.
The GWP also asks a more generic question about the corruption perceptions of respondents that we will use alongside the experience question in this
paper: “Is corruption widespread throughout the government in this country,
or not?” We refer to this as the “corruption perceptions” question. It was
asked in 112 of the 124 countries in our sample. However, as the samples of
countries in which the corruption experience and perception questions were
fielded do not match perfectly, the sample in which both questions were asked
comprises 103 countries. Appendix Table A contains a full description of all
questions from the GWP used in the paper, and the final sample of 103
countries is listed in Appendix Table B.
There are substantial conceptual and practical differences between the corruption experiences and corruption perceptions question. The former asks
about a respondent’s personal experiences with corruption, while the latter
solicits the respondent’s views about the prevalence of corruption, regardless of
whether the respondent has witnessed or experienced any corrupt acts himself.
We note first that one would naturally expect to see differences between the
responses to the two questions. The corruption experiences question is potentially a good gauge of “petty” or administrative corruption that individuals
might be likely to experience in their everyday lives: a policeman asking for a
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9. In fact, this second-hand information or “hearsay” effect might very well artificially amplify the
relationship between perceived corruption and confidence in public institutions. If a person who was
solicited for a bribe tells all his/her friends about the experience, the experience of a single corrupt act
may raise perceptions of the prevalence of corruption and lower confidence in institutions among all his/
her friends. Consistent with this we do in fact find that (a) typically a substantially larger fraction of
respondents state that corruption is widespread than those who respond to having personally
experienced a bribe situation, and (b) the correlation between corruption perceptions and confidence is
stronger than the correlation between corruption experiences and corruption. We are grateful to an
anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
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bribe instead of issuing a ticket, or a bureaucrat soliciting an irregular payment
for a permit. On the other hand, the corruption perceptions question can
potentially capture the prevalence of broader forms of corruption, particularly
at higher levels of government. The downside of this latter question of course
is that it does not draw on the respondent’s personal experience, but rather is
informed by the respondent’s exposure to second-hand information about
corrupt activities.9 As we argue in more detail in Section 4, a crucial advantage
of the corruption experiences question is that it is less likely to suffer from
reverse causality, in the sense that individuals’ confidence in institutions affects
their corruption experiences. This will be very important for our interpretation
of the empirical results that follow.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the country-level variation in these two measures
of corruption from the GWP. Figure 1 plots country average corruption perceptions versus corruption experiences. All countries in the sample fall above the
45-degree line, indicating that on average, respondents are more likely to
answer “yes” to the corruption perceptions question than to the corruption
experiences question, in all countries. In some countries, this gap is large: for
example, Japan and Italy have low rates of personal experience with corruption, but nevertheless strong perceptions of widespread corruption in government. One interpretation is that this suggests low rates of petty or
administrative corruption but a greater incidence of high-level or political corruption. In Figure 2 we plot the two corruption questions from the GWP
against a broad perceptions-based measure of corruption, the Worldwide
Governance Indicators ‘Control of Corruption’ variable (Kaufmann et al.,
2008). Both corruption questions display a fairly strong negative correlation
with the Control of Corruption measure. However, this correlation is far from
perfect, in part due to the fact that the Control of Corruption measure aggregates information from a large number of different data sources.
Our main objective in this paper is to empirically document the links
between corruption and confidence in public institutions. We measure the
latter using another question in the GWP, which asks respondents about their
confidence in a variety of institutions at the national level. Specifically, the
GWP asks “Do you have confidence in each of the following?: (a) the military,
(b) judicial system and courts, (c) national government, (d) health care or
medical systems, (e) financial institutions or banks, (f ) religious organizations,
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F I G U R E 1. GWP Corruption Perceptions and Experiences

10. We note also that the confidence questions refer to national-level public institutions, whereas the
corruption experiences question might in part reflect respondents’ interactions with local, rather than
national-level, public officials. To the extent that respondents entertain different views about different
levels of government this would work against us by weakening the correlation between the corruption
and confidence responses. As a robustness check however we have verified that our main specifications
also deliver similar results when we use two questions about confidence in local institutions also in the
GWP: (i) “In the city or area where you live, do you have confidence in the local police force?” and (ii)
“Do you approve of the leadership of the city or area where you live?”. Responses to these questions on
local institutions are strongly correlated with responses to questions on national-level institutions, with
a median pairwise correlation of 0.44, which is similar to the median pairwise correlation among
national-level responses.
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(g) quality and integrity of the media, and (h) honesty of elections. In this
paper we are primarily interested in confidence in public institutions, and so in
our core specifications we sum together the responses to (a), (b), (c) and (h) to
obtain an index of confidence in public institutions that ranges from 0 (respondents who report no confidence in any of the four institutions) to 4 (respondents who report confidence in all four institutions). We do not include (d), (e),
(f ), and (g) as these questions do not refer to purely public institutions.
Consistent with this interpretation, we find that responses to the four questions
on public institutions are more strongly correlated with each other (with a
median pairwise correlation of 0.42) than they are with responses to the questions about other institutions that are not necessarily public (with a median
pairwise correlation of 0.28). We will discuss in more detail below the extent
to which this strong correlation of responses regarding the two types of
institutions is attributable to unobserved individual-specific effects that might
subsequently bias our estimates of the effects of corruption on confidence. 10
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F I G U R E 2. Correlation of GWP Corruption Experiences and Perceptions
Questions with Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) ‘Control of
Corruption’ Variable
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Figure 3 documents how this measure of confidence in institutions from
the GWP compares with the most closely-related variables on confidence in
institutions taken from the World Values Survey.11 While the two measures
are highly correlated in the common sample of countries for which both
11. The WVS asks about respondents’ confidence in a variety of institutions. We aimed to match
this confidence index as closely as possible to our GWP index and therefore aggregated the answers to
the following four questions into an index ranging from 0 to 4: “I am going to name a number of
organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them [. . .]: a) the
armed forces, b) the courts, c) the government (in your nation’s capital), d) parliament.”
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F I G U R E 3. Comparing Confidence in Institutions: Country Average Values of
GWP and WVS Indices

12. A further distinction of the GWP relative to the Afrobarometer Surveys is that it provides
respondents only with binary response options to the corruption and confidence questions (Yes/No),
whereas the Afrobarometer Surveys offer more graduated responses (for example, “never”, “once or
twice”, “a few times”, or “often” are possible responses to the corruption experiences question). There
are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. While the more graduated response in principle
offers more detail, this detail can be difficult to interpret absent clear evidence on how respondents
“anchor” the distinction between categories such as “a few times” and “once or twice”.
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measures are available (a correlation of 0.81), it is worth noting the significantly smaller country coverage of the WVS. The circles in the graph represent countries that are present in our sample of the GWP but not in the
most recent wave of the WVS. Using the GWP index therefore significantly
increases the available cross-country sample to study effects of corruption
on confidence in institutions.
We note however that this very large increase in country coverage offered by
the GWP comes at the cost of a smaller number of respondents per country.
Our sample size varies with availability of explanatory variables, but ranges
from around 500 to 750 respondents per country, depending on the set of variables considered. In contrast, the WVS survey used to construct Figure 3 features on average 1419 respondents per country. And the Afrobarometer
Surveys used in several papers in this literature feature on average more than
1000 respondents by country-year (see for example Table 4 in Lavallée,
Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2008)), although in a much smaller crosssection of just 18 countries in two waves).12
Finally, Figure 4 documents the relationship between the corruption questions and the confidence in institutions index at the country level. The top
panel plots corruption perceptions against confidence in institutions and the
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F I G U R E 4. Confidence in Institutions and Corruption Experiences/Perceptions
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bottom panel plots corruption experiences against confidence. Both graphs
display a negative relationship between corruption and confidence although
this is much more pronounced for corruption perceptions. Here, all countries
with very low average corruption perceptions score high on confidence in
institutions. Scandinavian countries are the ones with the lowest perceived
corruption and the highest confidence in institutions. Turning to corruption
experiences, we see that in general countries with a higher share of people that
have experienced corruption report lower confidence in institutions. However,
there are a number of countries that have low levels of experienced corruption
but still report low confidence. In this group we find particularly Latin
American and Caribbean countries such as Panama, Argentina, Peru, and
Trinidad and Tobago.
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I II . MA IN R E SU LTS : R E S PO N D E N T -LE V E L E V I D E N C E
CORRUPTION AND CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS

ON

13. A better approach to dealing with this problem of frame-of-reference issues is at the survey
design stage, for example through the introduction of anchoring vignettes to provide common context
to respondents’ qualitative responses. This option is unfortunately not available to us in the GWP which
did not field such vignettes.
14. It would technically be more appropriate to estimate an ordered probit model because of the
discrete and ordered nature of our dependent variable. Doing this does not change the sign or level of
significance of the coefficients. However, because of the difficulties involved with interpreting ordered
probit coefficients as marginal effects, we chose to present linear regression results throughout the paper.
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While the cross-country relationship between corruption and confidence in institutions described above is suggestive of a link between the two, it is also far
from convincing. A major concern here is that there may be many countryspecific factors driving both variables. For example, some countries may simply
have dysfunctional governments. On the one hand this will lead to high levels of
corruption, and on the other hand public institutions naturally do not inspire
confidence in such an environment. Any correlation between our two variables
would simply reflect the omitted variable of government quality that is driving
both corruption and confidence in public institutions. Another related possibility
has to do with frame-of-reference issues in the survey responses themselves. It is
plausible for example that citizens of rich countries have greater expectations of
the quality and extent of public services provided by the government than do
citizens in poor countries. In this case small departures from these high standards might result in lower reported confidence in rich countries. Similarly there
might be greater tolerance of corruption in poor countries than in rich countries,
resulting in lower reported corruption perceptions or experiences in poor
countries. Thus cross-country differences in expectations of corruption and
public service quality might also spuriously contribute to the cross-country correlation between measured corruption and confidence.13
To address this first concern, we primarily focus on the respondent-level
variation within countries to study the relationship between corruption and
confidence in institutions. Doing so allows us to control for any omitted
country-level characteristics that might be driving the cross-country correlation.
Table 1 documents the distinction between the within- and between-country
results. Columns 1 and 3 reflect the between-country variation, showing coefficients of cross-country linear regressions of confidence in institutions on the
two corruption measures, using country-averaged data. In contrast columns
2 and 4 capture the within-country variation, reporting estimates of the corresponding regressions including country fixed effects.14 In all cases we find a
negative correlation between corruption and confidence in institutions that is
highly statistically significant. In the cross-country variation, the estimated
coefficients imply that a one-standard-deviation increase (across countries) in
either of the two corruption measures reduces confidence in institutions by
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T A B L E 1 . Bivariate Cross Country and Fixed Effects Regressions on the
Relationship between Confidence in Institutions and Corruption
(1)
Confidence in
institutions
cross-country
Corruption experiences

-2.318***
(-3.10)

(2)
Confidence in
institutions
fixed effects

N
No. of countries
R-sq

2.118***
(17.73)
103
103
0.098

(4)
Confidence in
institutions
fixed effects

-0.287***
(-8.94)

Corruption perceptions
_cons

(3)
Confidence in
institutions
cross-country

78063
103
0.230

-1.620***
(-5.17)
2.904***
(13.15)
103
103
0.233

-0.854***
(-21.32)

78063
103
0.271

between 0.2 and 0.3 points on a 0-4 scale.15 Within countries, the relationship
between corruption and confidence is also very strong. Here a one standard
deviation increases of either corruption variable within a country leads to a
reduction of confidence in institutions of between 0.1 and 0.3 points.16
Throughout the paper, we assess the significance of the within-country results
using standard errors that are clustered at the country level, and observations
are weighted using sampling weights provided by Gallup.
Anticipating our later discussion of endogeneity problems, we note that the
estimated effect of the corruption perceptions question is nearly three times as
large as the effect of the corruption experiences question. This is consistent
with our view that the former is much more likely to be endogenous to respondents’ confidence in public institutions, and that the latter much more plausibly
identifies a causal effect running from corruption to confidence. While the estimated coefficients are statistically significant and quantitatively large, we note
that the explanatory power of corruption for the confidence question is limited.
In particular, in the fixed-effects regressions, the bulk of the R-squared is due
to the country dummies. In contrast, the within R-squared net of the country
fixed effects is 0.01 for the corruption experiences question, and 0.06 for the
corruption perceptions question.
Although within-country regressions in Table 1 control for country-level
omitted variables, a possible objection is that there may also be a variety of
15. Note that the cross-country standard deviations of corruption experiences and perceptions are
0.083 and 0.184, respectively.
16. Within-country standard deviation of corruption experiences is 0.360 and of corruption
perceptions 0.368.
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Estimation in columns (1) and (3) is by ordinary least squares on country-level averages of all
variables, with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Estimation in columns (2) and (4) is
by weighted least squares using sampling weights provided by Gallup, and heteroskedasiticityconsistent standard errors are clustered at the country level. T-statistics in parentheses:
* p , 0.10, ** p , 0.05, *** p , 0.01
Source: Authors’ analysis with data from Gallup World Poll
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17. Of course, controlling for country-level fixed effects will not address concerns about variations
in quality of subnational governments. It could for example be the case that within a country, some
local governments are corrupt and deliver low-quality public services, and as a result respondents have
low confidence in local government. It could then be that some of our observed within-country
correlation reflects heterogeneity in government performance across local governments. It is difficult to
control for this directly as the GWP does not contain much information attitudes towards local
governments. As an imperfect proxy for this, we average responses to the question “In the city or area
where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with: (a) The public transporation systems, (b) the roads
and highways, and (c) the educational system or the schools. This question does clearly ask respondents
about public services in their locality, however it is not clear whether these are provided by local or by
national-level governments. Despite this ambiguity, we include this as a control variables (results not
reported but available from authors on request). Doing so has minimal effects on the size and
significance of our estimated effects of corruption on confidence. We are grateful to an anonymous
referee for pointing out this possible interpretation.
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individual-specific characteristics that influence both (i) respondents’ confidence
in institutions; and (ii) the likelihood that they view corruption as prevalent, or
that they report having been solicited for a bribe.17 For example, richer, older,
and more educated people might have more interactions with the state and so
be more likely to find themselves exposed to corruption, and might also be
more likely to have a cynical world view that precludes expressing confidence
in public institutions.
To control for this we introduce a set of core control variables that we have
found to be correlated with the corruption questions, and that also tend to be
significant predictors of confidence in institutions. These include respondent age,
gender, marital status, education, and the logarithm of self-reported income. We
also introduce as basic control variables whether the household in which the
respondent lives has access to the internet and a television. Access to such media
may have ambiguous effects on individual’s opinions about and experiences
with corruption and institutions. On the one hand, officials might have a harder
time extracting bribes from more informed citizens that have had the chance to
obtain information about laws and regulations concerning their dealings with
government. On the other hand, coverage of corruption cases in the media
might influence corruption perceptions of individuals and may therefore have a
direct effect on the answers to the perceptions question used in the GWP.
Table 2 presents the results adding these basic control variables. We note
first that missing data presents a problem when introducing our set of core
control variables. In particular, data availability for education and income is
incomplete, and this decreases our sample to about 57,000 individuals in
94 countries. To aid in comparison with the previous results, we first repeat
the results with no controls from Table 1 in the smaller sample for which the
control variables are available, and then report results with controls. Reducing
the size of the sample in this way makes little difference for the effect of
corruption on confidence in public institutions: the results without control
variables in columns (1) and (3) of Table 2 are essentially identical to those in
columns (2) and (4) of Table 1. Second, we note that while the additional
control variables featured in Table 2 do show some correlation with both the
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T A B L E 2 . Fixed Effects Regressions Including Control Variables
(1)
Confidence in
institutions
Corruption experiences

-0.298***
(-7.73)

Corruption perceptions

(3)
Confidence in
institutions

Age
Age2
Married

Tertiary education
Income
Internet access
TV
57095
94
0.226

0.00637
(0.30)
-0.0167***
(-6.51)
0.000210***
(7.39)
0.0933***
(4.57)
-0.121***
(-3.94)
-0.0853
(-1.65)
-0.000873
(-0.07)
-0.0437
(-1.38)
-0.0321
(-0.66)
57095
57095
94
94
0.230
0.271

-0.865***
(-20.54)
-0.00831
(-0.41)
-0.0149***
(-5.80)
0.000190***
(6.69)
0.0775***
(3.76)
-0.115***
(-4.02)
-0.108**
(-2.45)
-0.0104
(-0.82)
-0.0600**
(-2.08)
-0.0228
(-0.48)
57095
94
0.275

Estimation is by weighted least squares using sampling weights provided by Gallup, and
heteroskedasiticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at the country level. T-statistics in
parentheses: * p , 0.10, ** p , 0.05, *** p , 0.01
Source: Authors’ analysis with data from Gallup World Poll

corruption and confidence variables, we find that the estimated coefficients on
the corruption variables change very little, declining just slightly in absolute
value. Finally, we note that the control variables all enter with expected signs
and are generally significant. Older individuals seem to have a lower degree of
confidence in institutions although this relationship is not linear. Also, married
respondents express higher confidence than single ones. Higher income and
education as well as access to internet and TV appear to reduce confidence
although these latter effects are not statistically significant in all cases.
While the results in Table 2 are suggestive of a strong relationship
between confidence in institutions on the one hand, and corruption perceptions
and experiences on the other, one might nevertheless reasonably worry that this
correlation is driven by other unobserved respondent-specific characteristics.18
18. Of course a preferred way of dealing with this type of heterogeneity is to identify our effects
using individual-level over time variation in responses to the corruption and confidence questions.
Unfortunately this option is not available to us in our single cross-section of countries and respondents.

Downloaded from wber.oxfordjournals.org at International Monetary Fund on August 12, 2011

Secondary education

(4)
Confidence in
institutions

-0.282***
(-7.41)
-0.870***
(-20.71)

Male

N
No. of countries
R-sq

(2)
Confidence in
institutions
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19. See Appendix Table A for a detailed description of the kvetch proxies and the specific GWP
questions used in their construction.
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A leading possibility is that, conditional on the basic control variables described
above, some individuals may simply have a negative outlook or worldview
which makes them more likely to think that corruption is widespread, and at the
same time drives their lack of confidence in public institutions. Kaufmann and
Wei (2000) coin this as a "kvetch" effect, after the Yiddish word for habitual
complaining. To the extent that this drives the observed correlation between corruption and confidence in public institutions, we cannot interpret it as a causal
link from the former to the latter.
At first glance, one might think that this potential problem of kvetch is less
severe for the corruption experiences question than for the corruption perceptions question. However, while the former ostensibly is an objective question
about the respondent’s experience, there are nevertheless ways in which kvetch
might creep into responses to this question as well. First, respondents prone to
kvetch might simply falsely claim that they had been solicited for a bribe. They
might also be more likely to interpret ambiguous interactions with a public official as a request for a bribe. Therefore, respondents who in general tend to complain a lot might also be more likely to report interactions with public officials
as involving a request for a bribe. Second, the question about experiences with
bribery follows a battery of other questions about corruption, one of which is
the corruption perceptions questions described above. It is possible that respondents prone to kvetch might want to reinforce their point of stating that government corruption is a problem by subsequently answering that they personally
have found themselves in a bribe situation, even if this is not the case.
Our strategy for dealing with this potential problem is to introduce control
variables that we think may be good proxies for the propensity to kvetch. We
consider three sets of such proxies.19 The first set relies on questions in the
survey that focus on individuals’ self-reported well-being. For example, the
GWP asks respondents whether they are satisfied with their living standards,
and which rung on the ladder of life that they find themselves. The GWP also
asks respondents whether they have felt a variety of emotions such as worry,
stress, or happiness in the previous day. These variables are plausibly correlated
with individual respondents’ predisposition to complain. Second, the GWP
asks respondents their opinions about a number of country-level variables
including whether the economy is doing well or poorly, whether the economic
outlook is favorable, and whether corruption is getting better or worse. Since
our regressions include country fixed effects that soak up all national-level variation, variation in individuals’ responses to these questions can be interpreted
as capturing their idiosyncratic perceptions of the same national-level reality,
and as such will also plausibly be correlated with kvetch.
As a final control for kvetch, we note that the battery of questions from
which our "confidence in institutions" variables are drawn includes a further
question about confidence in religious organizations. It seems plausible to us
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20. A closely-related interpretation of these results is that individuals vary in their extent of
“generalized trust”, which could be thought of as the opposite of ‘kvetch’. In the extreme, one could very
well interpret responses to the corruption perceptions question and responses to questions about confidence
in public institutions as both simply serving as proxies for individuals’ “generalized trust”. Our strategy for
dealing with this problem would be the same as our strategy for dealing with ‘kvetch’ as the two are quite
similar. The first is to introduce controls that might serve as proxies for ‘kvetch’ or “generalized trust”
(although we note that Newton and Norris (2000) examined the question if trust and confidence is a
feature of basic personality types but found little evidence to support this hypothesis.) In this respect our
strategy of controlling for confidence in non-public institutions is particularly helpful because it directly
controls for individuals’ confidence and focuses only on the differential degree of confidence in public
relative to non-public institutions. The second is to emphasize the corruption experiences question, which
as we have argued is less likely to be tainted by either “kvetch” or “generalized trust”.
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that corruption perceptions or experiences are likely to have little direct impact
on confidence in religious organizations. However there might be an indirect
effect through kvetch: individuals more likely to complain in general might also
report less confidence in religious organizations purely because of their propensity to kvetch. This suggests using a kind of differencing strategy to control for
kvetch. In particular, one might ask whether corruption reduces the difference in
confidence in public institutions and confidence in religious organizations.
Alternatively and more flexibly, we can simply introduce confidence in religious
organizations directly into our main specification as a control for kvetch.
Table 3 documents the results controlling for these proxies for kvetch. Since
not all of the kvetch variables are available for all observations, our sample
shrinks further to 49,019 respondents in 90 countries. As in Table 2, we first
document that our main results with basic respondent-level controls do not
change as we move to this smaller sample (compare columns (1) and (3) in
Tables 2 and 3). More interesting is how our results on the effects of corruption
perceptions and experiences on confidence in institutions change when we
control for kvetch. We find that the estimated impact of corruption on confidence
falls by about 34 percent (for the corruption experiences question) and by 40
percent (for the corruption perceptions question). This is a good indication that
kvetch effects are present in the data and are at least partially addressed by the
controls that we introduce. Interestingly, while both the corruption perceptions
and corruption experiences questions might be subject to kvetch, we think it is
plausible that kvetch effects are stronger for the former. The results in Table 3
are consistent with this: the coefficient on the corruption perceptions falls relatively more after the introduction of the kvetch controls. We note also that the
kvetch controls are all highly-significant predictors of the confidence responses,
and collectively contribute to a substantial increase in the explanatory power of
the regressions (the R-squared increases from 0.22 to 0.38 in the case of corruption experiences, and from 0.27 to 0.39 in the case of corruption perceptions.
However, even after introducing these very rigorous controls for kvetch, the
negative relationship between corruption and confidence remains highly significant and the magnitude of both corruption coefficients remains large.20
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T A B L E 3 : Fixed Effects Regressions Controlling for Kvetch
(1)
Confidence in
institutions
Corruption
experiences
Corruption
perceptions
Male
Age
Age2
Married

Tertiary education
Income
Internet access
TV

20.00647
(20.34)
20.00135
(20.54)
0.0000456*
(1.66)
0.0399**
(2.13)
20.118***

(23.94)
20.0822
(21.49)
20.000267
(20.02)
20.0612*
(21.71)
20.0327
(20.67)

(24.79)
20.0791*
(21.74)
20.0470***
(23.68)
20.0784***
(23.17)
20.101***
(22.86)
0.0151***
(2.74)
0.228***
(8.30)
0.0533***
(4.90)
0.530***
(17.52)
20.190***
(211.61)
20.272***
(215.54)
0.705***

Standard of living
Emotions
Economy good/bad
Economic outlook
Corruption trend
Religious
organizations
N
No. of countries
R-sq

49019
90
0.218

(4)
Confidence in
institutions

20.873***
(220.05)
20.00512
(20.23)
20.0141***
(25.21)
0.000180***
(6.02)
0.0739***
(3.37)
20.124***

20.518***
(216.37)
20.0144
(20.78)
20.00118
(20.47)
0.0000425
(1.53)
0.0342*
(1.80)
20.116***

(24.04)
20.102**
(22.18)
20.00943
(20.68)
20.0817**
(22.55)
20.0234
(20.49)

(24.81)
20.0916**
(22.21)
20.0488***
(23.76)
20.0872***
(23.68)
20.0943**
(22.62)
0.0139**
(2.61)
0.220***
(8.02)
0.0519***
(4.77)
0.489***
(17.20)
20.183***
(211.70)
20.207***
(212.61)
0.689***

20.185***
(25.62)

0.0123
(0.52)
20.0157***
(25.90)
0.000198***
(6.76)
0.0890***
(4.05)
20.131***

Ladder of life

(3)
Confidence in
institutions

(19.25)
49019
90
0.378

49019
90
0.264

(18.81)
49019
90
0.392

Estimation is by weighted least squares using sampling weights provided by Gallup, and
heteroskedasiticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at the country level. T-statistics in parentheses: * p , 0.10, ** p , 0.05, *** p , 0.01
Source: Authors’ analysis with data from Gallup World Poll
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Secondary
education

20.280***
(26.67)

(2)
Confidence in
institutions
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21. Since the dependent variable for the individual confidence in institutions regressions is a binary
variable, a probit specification would be more appropriate than the linear probability model. However,
to improve comparability with previous results we report estimates from linear probability models here.
We have also estimated the specifications in Table 4 using a probit model and find a similar pattern of
relative magnitudes of the effect of corruption on the different confidence in institutions variables.
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Thus far we have seen that there is a large and statistically significant partial
correlation between measures of corruption and confidence in public institutions, and that this result is robust to the addition of (a) country fixed
effects, (b) a set of respondent-level controls, and (c) a set of proxies for
‘kvetch’. In this section we subject these main results to a variety of further
robustness checks. We first disaggregate the confidence in institutions measure
into its four components and investigate how the effects of corruption vary
across these components. We then also estimate our main specification
country-by-country, and document how the estimated coefficients on the
corruption questions vary by country, by level of corruption, and by level of
development.
In Table 4 we disaggregate the confidence in institutions measure into its
four components: confidence in the military, judiciary, national government,
and in the honesty of elections. In the first four columns we report results for
our core specification, using each of these components of the overall confidence
measure separately as the dependent variable.21 We do this for both the corruption experiences (top panel) and corruption perceptions measure (bottom
panel). In all cases, we include, but do not report estimated coefficients for, the
full set of control variables used in Table 3. For the corruption experiences
question, we find only modest differences across components in terms of the
magnitude of the estimated partial correlation between corruption and confidence. This effect is largest for confidence in the judiciary at 0.06, and smallest
for confidence in the honesty of elections, at 0.04. There is somewhat more
variation across the various confidence measures for the corruption perceptions
question. The estimated effect of corruption is much lower for confidence in
the military, at 0.06, than it is for the other three measures, which range from
0.13 to 0.17.
Thus far we have assumed that the slope of the relationship between corruption and confidence in public institutions is the same in all countries, at all
income levels, and at all levels of corruption. We now relax this assumption
and re-estimate our main specification from Table 3, country-by-country, so
that we can investigate how this slope varies across countries. We note first
that the means of the country-by-country estimates in Table 5 are slightly
smaller than the pooled estimates in Table 3 (at -0.13 and -0.47 for the corruption experiences and perceptions questions, respectively). The sign of the estimated coefficient is also fairly consistently negative across countries, with
67 percent (91 percent) of country estimates being negative for the corruption
experiences ( perceptions) question. However, and not surprisingly, in many
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T A B L E 4 . Disaggregation of “Confidence in Institutions” Index
(1)
Military
linear

(2)
Judiciary
linear

-0.0431***

-0.0576***

-0.0480***

-0.0367***

(-4.74)
0.232

(-5.02)
0.234

(-4.70)
0.278

(-3.48)
0.271

-0.0623***

-0.133***

-0.166***

-0.157***

R-sq

(-6.82)
0.234

(-12.18)
0.241

(-13.54)
0.291

(-13.99)
0.282

N
No. of countries

49019
90

49019
90

49019
90

49019
90

Dependent variable is
Corruption experiences
R-sq
Dependent variable is
Corruption perceptions

(3)
National Gov.
linear

(4)
Elections
linear

countries the estimated effects are not statistically significant, given the much
smaller sample of observations on which to base inference in each country. In
fact, the mean number of observations per country for the regressions in
Table 5 is just 594, as opposed to 49,019 in the pooled regressions of Table 3.
We next examine how these estimated coefficients vary across regions (using
the standard World Bank regional classification). While it is evident that corruption experiences as well as perceptions affect confidence negatively in all
regions on average, the magnitude and strength of the relationship varies
widely across regions, from -0.06 to -0.32 in the case of corruption experiences, and from -0.10 to -1.00 in the case of corruption perceptions. In the
case of corruption experiences, the largest mean estimated effect is for the
South Asia region. The relationship between corruption and confidence in institutions is also the strongest in this region with 60 percent of countries reporting a statistically significant negative relationship. At the same time however,
while South Asia showed the largest coefficient of corruption experiences, its
perceptions coefficient is the smallest among the regions in our sample.
In the remaining panels of Table 5 we document how the estimated correlation between corruption and confidence varies with the average level of corruption, and the level of development, of the country. To do this, we divide
countries into three equal groups according to their country-level average score
on the corruption question, and also their level of GDP per capita. We then
report the mean (across countries) of the estimated slope coefficient on corruption from the country-by-country regressions, for each group. In the case of
corruption experiences, there is a pronounced non-linear relationship in
countries’ overall level of corruption. In countries where reported corruption
experiences are on average either very low or very high, the estimated effect of
corruption experiences on confidence in institutions is small (at 0.07 and 0.09
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Estimation is by weighted least squares using sampling weights provided by Gallup, and
heteroskedasiticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at the country level. T-statistics in
parentheses: * p , 0.10, ** p , 0.05, *** p , 0.01

T A B L E 5 . Disaggregation into Subgroups Depending on Geographic Region, Level of Corruption, and Income
CORRUPTION EXPERIENCES
Mean
estimated
slope
coefficient

Full sample

90

-0.134

0.255

Europe &
Central Asia
Middle-East &
North Africa
East Asia &
Pacific
South Asia
Latin America &
Caribbean
Sub-Saharan
Africa
High income:
OECD
High income:
non-OECD

11

-0.172

4

Proportion of
negative and
signficant
coefficients*

Mean
estimated
slope
coefficient

0.678

0.222

-0.466

0.376

0.911

0.633

0.200

0.727

0.272

-0.312

0.419

0.818

0.454

-0.153

0.282

0.750

0.250

-0.730

0.250

1.000

1.000

9

-0.060

0.175

0.667

0.222

-0.224

0.297

0.778

0.333

5
19

-0.319
-0.194

0.265
0.271

0.800
0.684

0.600
0.369

-0.104
-0.490

0.259
0.191

0.600
1.000

0.400
0.737

18

-0.061

0.278

0.611

0.222

-0.472

0.521

0.889

0.556

20

-0.113

0.281

0.650

0.000

-0.561

0.211

1.000

0.800

4

-0.094

0.143

0.750

0.000

-1.006

0.385

1.000

0.750

30

-0.066

0.241

0.600

0.000

-0.485

0.407

0.933

0.633

Standard
deviation of Proportion of
slope
negative
coefficient
coefficients

Proportion of
negative and
signficant
coefficients*
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Low level of
corruption
experiences/
perceptions

Standard
deviation of Proportion of
slope
negative
coefficient
coefficients
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No. of
countries
in group

CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
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TABLE 5. Continued
CORRUPTION EXPERIENCES
Mean
estimated
slope
coefficient

Standard
deviation of Proportion of
slope
negative
coefficient
coefficients

Proportion of
negative and
signficant
coefficients*

Mean
estimated
slope
coefficient

Medium level of
corruption
experiences/
perceptions
High level of
corruption
experiences/
perceptions

30

-0.243

0.238

30

-0.093

Low income
Medium income
High income

30
30
30

-0.129
-0.153
-0.121

Standard
deviation of Proportion of
slope
negative
coefficient
coefficients

Proportion of
negative and
signficant
coefficients*

0.833

0.367

-0.447

0.345

0.867

0.667

0.256

0.600

0.300

-0.465

0.384

0.933

0.600

0.272
0.244
0.256

0.600
0.733
0.700

0.300
0.300
0.067

-0.370
-0.449
-0.579

0.437
0.406
0.234

0.867
0.867
1.000

0.400
0.733
0.767

* statistically significant coefficients at at least the 5 percent level were included
Each row provides summary statistics on indicated slope coefficients estimated country-by-country within the indicated country groups. Country-level
estimation is by weighted least squares using sampling weights provided by Gallup.
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No. of
countries
in group

CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
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respectively). In contrast, for intermediate-corruption countries, the adverse
effect of corruption on confidence is much larger.
This suggests that in countries where corruption is rare, a respondent’s isolated experience with having been solicited for a bribe will not be enough to substantially undermine his or her faith in overall public institutions. And similarly,
in countries where corruption is widespread, personal experiences with or perceptions of corruption might also not change confidence in public institutions
because this confidence is very low to begin with. In contrast, for countries with
a moderate prevalence of corruption, personal experiences with corruption have
a stronger adverse impact on confidence in public institutions. Interestingly,
however, this pattern is not present in the corruption perceptions question, nor
is it present when countries are divided into groups according to income levels.

We now discuss the extent to which the partial correlation between corruption
and confidence in public institutions can be interpreted as a causal effect from the
former to the latter. As noted in the introduction, there is an important identification problem: corruption might lead to a loss of confidence in public institutions
as we emphasize here, but at the same time, respondents who report low confidence in public institutions might as a result hold the belief that corruption is
widespread as well. This point is also noticed by Cho and Kirwin (2007) who
argue that individuals who do not trust public institutions might be more likely to
resort to bribery to advance their interests, or to believe that corruption is widespread. This can lead to vicious circles where corruption and a lack of confidence
in public institutions feed off each other. This potential for bi-directional causation complicates the interpretation of the partial correlation between corruption
and confidence in institutions that we have documented. This is the classic identification problem: the observed correlation between corruption and confidence
might reflect causal effects from corruption to confidence that we emphasize. But
it could also reflect causation in the opposite direction.
We note first that a particular strength of the corruption experiences question is that it is much less likely to be prone to reverse causation than the corruption perceptions question. To see why, recall that the experience question
asks respondents whether they have been solicited for a bribe during the past
12 months. To the extent that the decision to solicit a bribe originates with the
public official with whom the respondent is interacting, there should be no problems of reverse causation: it seems unlikely that a public official would even
know the respondent’s confidence in public institutions, let alone base his
decision to solicit a bribe on it.22 This stands in contrast with the corruption
22. Indeed, the pattern of reverse causation might go against our results, if individuals with low
confidence in public institutions choose not to interact with government agencies and so are less likely
to report having been asked for a bribe.
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perceptions question, where there is a more plausible channel of causation in
the opposite direction: individuals who have low confidence in public institutions may precisely for this reason also believe that corruption is widespread
in government. This potential endogeneity bias may in part account for the
fact that in most of our specifications thus far, the estimated slope of the
relationship between corruption perceptions and confidence is larger in absolute value, and typically is also much more significant, than in the regressions
using the corruption experiences question. Thus we argue that our results using
the corruption experiences question provide a more plausible estimate of the
causal effect of corruption on confidence in public institutions than do our
results with the corruption perceptions question.
At the same time, we acknowledge that there may still be such endogeneity
bias, although to a lesser extent, even in the corruption experiences question.
This would occur if respondents expressing a low confidence in public institutions are more likely to interpret an ambiguous interaction with a public official as a request for a bribe than other respondents with higher confidence in
public institutions. Such potential endogeneity bias is extremely difficult to
correct using purely cross-sectional observational data such as what we have in
the GWP. This is because the usual strategy with observational data of identifying instruments (variables that plausibly affect only corruption, but not confidence in institutions, and vice versa) is very difficult to implement since it is
hard to make a compelling case for the requisite exclusion restrictions.
In particular, we find it hard to make a convincing case that there are variables in the GWP that predict corruption at the individual level, but do not
have direct predictive power for confidence in institutions, that we could then
use as instruments for corruption. To illustrate why we think this approach is
not promising, consider the identifying assumptions implicit in the few papers
in the literature that have attempted this instrumental variables strategy. Cho
and Kirwin (2007) make the identifying assumption that variables such as
respondents’ overall trust in others, and their perceptions of the political influence of ethnic groups, matter only for corruption and have no direct effect on
confidence in institutions (see the exclusion restrictions implicit in their
Table 1). Lavallée, Razafindrakoto, and Roubaud (2008) claim with little justification that a dummy variable indicating that the respondent is head of the
household, and a variable capturing the respondent’s views on the acceptability
of paying a bribe, matter only for corruption and have no direct effect on
confidence.
We do not find such exclusion restrictions to be convincing. One might
easily imagine that any of these variables are directly correlated with confidence in public institutions: for example respondents’ might believe that paying
a bribe is acceptable precisely because they have no confidence in public institutions. It is also striking that in both papers, the instrumented estimates of the
effects of corruption on confidence are vastly larger in absolute value than the
uninstrumented estimates, while the feedback problem these authors seek to
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y ¼ bx þ 1
x ¼ gy þ y

ð1Þ

We are primarily interested in the slope coefficient b which captures the effect
of corruption on confidence. However, we cannot identify this effect absent
some instrument that shifts corruption without at the same time affecting confidence, i.e. we need to find a variable that is included in the second equation
but excluded from the first.
Absent such an instrument, the problem is simply that there are four
unknown parameters in this system (b, g, and the two variances of the error
terms), while there are just three moments in the data (V(x), V(y), and
COV(x,y)).25 However, we can still make progress by exploring how our
23. Lavallée, Razafindrakoto and Robaud (2008) claim support for their identification strategy in
the fact that tests of overidentifying restrictions fail to reject the null of instrument validity. Here they
fall into the (unfortunately common) pitfall of failing to recognize that such tests are valid only if at
least one instrument is indeed valid. We think it is very difficult to make such a case even for just one
instrument in this context.
24. An alternative approach sometimes used with survey data is to use the average of the corruption
question across all observations within a pre-specified group, for example all respondents in the same
city, as an instrument for corruption. This is plausible as an identification strategy only to the extent
that we think that the unexplained portion of confidence is uncorrelated across respondents within a
group. This assumption is difficult to justify in practice.
25. In fact things might be even more complicated, as we have assumed for simplicity that the
covariance between the two structural errors is zero as well. We justify this simplifying assumption by
observing that in Table 3 we have already controlled for a large set of variables that might
simultaneously be driving corruption and confidence. Thus it is more plausible that the errors in the
orthogonalized system here are independent.
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correct would suggest that the true effects of corruption on confidence should
be much smaller in absolute value than the corresponding OLS estimates (see
columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 in Cho and Kirwin (2007) and Table 4 in
Lavallée, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2008)). These counterintuitive results
likely are due to a failure of the exclusion restrictions required to justify the
instrumental variables estimator.23 24 In contrast, we have consistently found
that the magnitude of the effect of the more exogenous corruption experiences
question on confidence is always substantially smaller than the effect of the
corruption perceptions question, consistent with the view that the former is
less tainted by reverse causation.
Absent compelling instruments, we use an argument based on Leamer
(1981) to provide a rough bound on the extent to which our estimates might
reflect reverse causation. To make this concrete let y denote the portion of confidence that is orthogonal to all of the control variables, including the country
fixed effects, in columns 2 and 4 of Table 3, and let x denote the same orthogonal component of corruption. The possibility of causal effects in both directions between corruption and confidence can be captured by the assumption
that y and x are generated by the following system of two equations:
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estimate of b would change given differing assumptions on the strength of the
reverse causation captured by g. To do this, express the three observable data
moments in terms of the four unknown parameters, and then solve for b conditional on a value of g. Then by varying g we can explore the robustness of
our conclusions about b to alternative assumptions regarding the strength of
the reverse causation. Some simple algebra delivers this very natural estimator
for b as a function of g:
COVðx; yÞ  gVðyÞ
b^ ¼
VðxÞ  gCOVðx; yÞ

ð2Þ

26. While rarely used, it is interesting to note that the basic argument here is nearly 80 years old!
Leamer (1981) credits Leontief (1929) with first performing this basic calculation. A very recent and
growing literature on instrumental variables estimation with imperfect instruments can be thought of as
resurrecting some of these basic insights as well (see for example Kraay (forthcoming), Conley, Hansen
and Rossi (forthcoming), and Nevo and Rosen (forthcoming). In the case of OLS which we consider
here where the corruption variable serves as its own instrument, the unobserved feedback parameter g
governs the strength of the correlation between the instrument and the error term. The approaches in
these three more recent papers can be thought of as a more formal way of exploring how the IV
estimator varies with alternative assumptions about the strength of the correlations of the instrument
with the error term.
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Note that when g ¼ 0 we retrieve the OLS estimator, i.e.
b^ ¼ COVðx; yÞ=VðxÞ, since in this case there is no feedback from confidence
to corruption, and so OLS is valid. On the other hand, note that b^ ¼ 0 when
g ¼ COV(x,y)/V(y) which is simply the OLS estimate of the feedback effect in
the second equation. This is because if there is in fact no causal effect running
from corruption to confidence, then the second equation can be estimated by
OLS.26 Moreover, the range from g ¼ 0 to g ¼ COV(x,y)/V(y) seems to us to
be a reasonable prior bound for the magnitude of reverse causation. It seems
reasonable to assume that g , 0, i.e. less confidence implies more corruption.
However, the magnitude of this effect is likely to be less (in absolute value)
than g ¼ COV(x,y)/V(y). If it were not, then the data would imply that b . 0,
i.e. that corruption raises confidence in public institutions, which seems
implausible.
We plot this estimate of b (on the vertical axis) as a function of g (on the
horizontal axis) in Figure 5, using this prior plausible range of values for the
magnitude of reverse causation. The top panel refers to the corruption experiences question, and the bottom to the corruption perceptions question. In both
panels, when g ¼ 0 we retrieve the OLS estimates of b on the horizontal axis
corresponding to those in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 3. As we allow for the
possibility of more and more reverse causation, i.e. as g becomes more and
more negative capturing a stronger effect of confidence on corruption, our estimate of the main effect of interest, b, becomes closer and closer to zero. We
also report 95 percent confidence intervals for b, and these suggest that our
estimate of b would be insignificantly different from zero only if g were very
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F I G U R E 5. Robustness of Main Results to Reverse Causation
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large (in absolute value). In particular, we note that the 95 percent confidence
interval for b includes zero only when g , -0.01 in the case of the corruption
experiences question, and when g , -0.04 for the corruption perceptions question. This represents less than one-quarter of the plausible range for g indicated
on the horizontal axis in each figure.
We conclude from this that it is a priori very plausible that there may be
causal effects running in both directions between corruption and confidence in
public institutions. In this paper we are concerned primarily with the channel
from corruption to confidence. While we are unable to formally isolate this
channel using credible instruments given data limitations, we nevertheless
argue that there are at least two reasons why the results we show are at least
partially interpretable as a causal effect from corruption to confidence. The
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first is that, as we have discussed, it is much more difficult to see the channel
for potential reverse causation in the results using the corruption experiences
question. The second is that, even if reverse causation were present, it would
need to be extremely strong in order to undermine our conclusion of a statistically significant effect of corruption on confidence.
VI. WHY DOES THE ADVERSE EFFECT OF CORRUPTION
O N CO N F I D E N C E I N I N S T I T U T I O N S M AT T E R ?
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Thus far we have documented a strong negative relationship between corruption and confidence in public institutions. We conclude by using a small
number of variables available in the GWP to investigate some direct consequences of this loss of confidence. We do so in an effort to shed some light on
what might be some of the mechanisms through which corruption-induced
lack of confidence in public institutions could undermine the functioning of
those institutions. In particular, we find some evidence that reduced confidence
in public institutions leads to a reduction in political participation, raises
support for violent means of political expression, and increases the desire of
respondents to vote with their feet through emigratation. We interpret each of
these as a signal of respondents’ likelihood to “opt out” of participation in
public institutions in a country. This in turn is suggestive of how lack of confidence in public institutions undermines their effectiveness, but it is of course
far from the final word.
We draw on a number of questions from the GWP to measure these consequences of corruption-induced losses in confidence. To measure political participation, we use the GWP question which asks “In the past month, have you
voiced your opinion to a public official?" As a measure of support for violent
forms of protest, we use a question from the GWP which asks: “Do you think
groups that are oppressed and are suffering from injustice can improve their
situation by peaceful means alone?” And finally, the desire to emigrate is
captured by response to the question "Ideally, if you had the opportunity,
would you like to move permanently to another country, or would you prefer
to continue living in this country?"
In Table 6 we document the relationship between corruption, confidence,
and these three outcomes. In the first column, we report the simple bivariate
relationship between the confidence variable and the three outcome variables
of interest, and in the second column we introduce the full set of control variables from Table 3. We find strong evidence that a lack of confidence in public
institutions raises sympathy for violent protest, raises the desire to migrate, and
reduces political participation. We next investigate the extent to which this
reflects the effect of corruption perceptions and corruption experiences. In
columns three and four we estimate regressions of the three outcome variables
on the two corruption variables alone (but still controlling for the full set of
control variables from Table 3). Here we find evidence that those individuals

T A B L E 6 . Why Do Adverse Effects of Corruption Matter?
(1)
Achieve change by
peaceful means
Confidence in
institutions

(2)
Achieve change by
peaceful means

0.0958***

0.0776***

(8.70)

(6.48)

Corruption
experiences

(3)
Achieve change by
peaceful means

(4)
Achieve change by
peaceful means

20.0833***
(22.84)

Corruption
perceptions
N
No. of countries
Controls

0.0767***

(6.41)
20.0690**

(6.61)

(22.45)

46249
89
no
(1)

46249
89
yes
(2)

46249
89
yes
(3)

(21.76)
46249
89
yes
(4)

Like to move to
other country?
20.127***

Like to move to
other country?
20.0676***

Like to move to
other country?

Like to move to
other country?

(28.45)

(24.63)
0.249***
(7.15)

Corruption
perceptions

20.0174

46249
89
yes
(5)

(20.58)
46249
89
yes
(6)

Like to move to
other country?
20.0629***

Like to move to
other country?
20.0622***

(24.27)
0.236***

(24.26)

(6.63)
0.130***

34184

34184

34184

(4.35)
34184

0.0964***

34184

(3.22)
34184
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N

0.0764***

20.0572*

Corruption
experiences

(6)
Achieve change by
peaceful means

Clausen, Kraay, and Nyiri

Confidence in
institutions

(5)
Achieve change by
peaceful means

No. of countries
Controls

Confidence in
institutions

(2)
Achieve change by
peaceful means

69
no
(1)
Voiced opinion to
official
0.0259***

69
yes
(2)
Voiced opinion to
official
0.0127

(4.25)

(1.26)

Corruption
experiences

(3)
Achieve change by
peaceful means
69
yes
(3)
Voiced opinion to
official

(4)
Achieve change by
peaceful means
69
yes
(4)
Voiced opinion to
official

0.301***
(9.00)

Corruption
perceptions
N
No. of countries
Controls

(5)
Achieve change by
peaceful means
69
yes
(5)
Voiced opinion to
official
0.0183*

69
yes
(6)
Voiced opinion to
official
0.0127

(1.80)
0.305***

(1.25)

(9.09)
0.00135

20.00537

48774
90
no

48774
90
yes

48774
90
yes

(6)
Achieve change by
peaceful means

(20.19)
48774
90
yes

48774
90
yes

(0.05)
48774
90
yes

Estimation is by weighted least squares using sampling weights provided by Gallup, and heteroskedasiticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at
the country level. T-statistics in parentheses: * p , 0.10, ** p , 0.05, *** p , 0.01
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(1)
Achieve change by
peaceful means
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have used data from the Gallup World Poll, a unique and very
large global household survey, to document a quantitatively large and statistically significant negative effect of corruption on confidence in public institutions. This highlights an important, but relatively under-examined, channel
through which corruption can inhibit development. Our findings are robust to
the inclusion of a large set of controls for country and respondent-level characteristics. In addition to considering a much larger sample of countries and a
more thorough set of control variables, our main contribution relative to the
existing literature is our treatment of potential endogeneity biases. We have
argued that a key advantage of specific experiential questions about corruption
is that they are much more plausibly exogenous to respondents’ reported confidence in public institutions. As a result, the partial correlation between such
questions and confidence can much more plausibly be interpreted as a causal
effect from the former to the latter.
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who have experienced corruption or who perceive corruption to be high in
their country show support for violent protest and express increased desire to
permanently leave their country. In contrast however, having had a corruption
experience raises the likelihood of individuals voicing their opinion to public
officials. While the GWP does not ask about the nature of this interaction with
a public official, it is possible that this positive correlation reflects precisely
respondents complaining to public officials about their experience with
corruption.
Finally, we introduce both corruption measures together with confidence in
institutions as explanatory variables. Doing so sheds light on whether the
effects of corruption on these outcomes operate only through confidence in
institutions (in which case the corruption variables would not enter significantly), or whether there are direct effects of corruption (in which case they
would enter significantly even after controlling for confidence in public institutions). In the case of corruption experiences, there seems to be fairly clear
evidence of both direct and indirect effects, as both the corruption and confidence variables enter significantly. In the case of corruption perceptions
however we find evidence of a direct effect only for the emigration question.
Overall these findings provide some support to the findings of Putnam (2000)
and Uslaner (2002) that institutional trust contributes to citizen’s involvement
in the political process.
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A P P E N D I X T A B L E A . Variable Descriptions
Variable
Confidence in
institutions

Corruption
experiences

Corruption
perceptions
Male

Secondary
education
Tertiary
education
Income

Internet access
TV
Ladder of life

Standard of
living

Index composed of four subcategories of this question:
"In this country, do you have confidence in each of
the following, or not? How about the military?
Judicial system and courts? National government?
Honesty of elections?"
"Sometimes people have to give a bribe or a present in
order to solve their problems. In the last 12 months,
were you, personally, faced with this kind of
situation, or not (regardless of whether you have the
bribe/present or not)?"
"Is corruption widespread throughout the government
in this country, or not?"

Definition
scale of 0 to 4 with 4
indicating highest
confidence

dummy: 1 indicating
exposure to bribery

dummy: 1 indicating
corruption is
widespread
Share of male
respondents
Age in years
"What is your current marital status?"; responses of
dummy: 1 indicating
"married" as well as "domestic partner" were
married/domestic
aggregated to form the "Married" variable
partner
"What is your highest level of education?"
dummy: 1 indicating
highest level is
tertiary education
"What is your highest level of education?"
dummy: 1 indicating
highest level is
secondary education
"What is your total monthly household income, before Income in US dollars
taxes? Please include income from wages and
salaries, remittances from family member living
elsewhere, farming and all other sources."
"Does your home have access to the internet?"
dummy: 1 indicating
yes
"Does your home have a television?"
dummy: 1 indicating
yes
scale of 0 to 10 with
“Imagine a ladder numbered from zero at the bottom
10 being best life
to ten at the top. Suppose we say that the top of the
ladder represents the best possible life for you, and
the bottom of the ladder represents the worst
possible life for you. On which step of the ladder
would you say you personally feel you stand at this
time, assuming that the higher the step the better
you feel about your life, and the lower the step the
worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to
the way you fell?"
“Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your standard of (0 or 1) with 1
living, all the things you can buy and do?”.
indicating satisfied
(Continued )
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Age
Married

Wording of Question in GWP
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APPENDIX TABLE A. Continued
Variable
Emotions

Wording of Question in GWP

scale of 0 to 3 with 3
indicating yes to all
3 questions
dummy: 1 indicating
good
dummy: 1 indicating
better
dummy: 1 indicating
corruption is higher
dummy: 1 indicating
confidence
dummy: 1 indicating
"yes"
dummy: 1 indicating
"peaceful means
alone will work"

dummy: 1 indicating
"would like to
move"
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Index composed of three subcategories of this question:
“Did you experience the following feelings during a
lot of the day yesterday? How about Worry? Stress?
Happiness?”
Economy good/ "Do you believe the current economic conditions in
bad
this country are good, or not?"
Economic
"Right now, do you think the economic conditions in
outlook
this country as a whole, are getting better or getting
worse?"
Corruption
"Do you think the level of corruption in this country is
trend
lower, about the same, or higher than it was 5 years
ago?"
Religious
"In this country, do you have confidence in each of the
organizations
following, or not? How about religious
organizations (churches, mosques, temples etc.)?"
Voiced opinion "Have you done any of the following in the past
to public
month? How about voiced your opinion to a public
official?"
official
Achieve change "Some people believe that groups that are oppressed
and are suffering from injustice can improve their
by peaceful
means
situations by peaceful means alone. Other do not
believe that peaceful means alone will work to
improve the situation for such oppressed groups.
Which do you believe?"
Like to move to "Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to
other country
move permanently to another country, or would you
prefer to continue living in this country?"

Definition

246

Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Poland
Russia
Turkey
Ukraine

East Asia &
Pacific
Cambodia
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Mongolia
Philippines
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam

South Asia
Bangladesh
India
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka

Latin America &
Caribbean
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

Sub-Saharan
Africa
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Chad
Ethiopia
Ghana
Kenya
Liberia
Madagascar
Mauritania
Niger
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia

Middle-East &
North Africa
Algeria
Djibouti
Iran
Lebanon
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Europe &
Central Asia

High income:
OECD
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

High income:
non-OECD
Estonia
Israel
Malta
Trinidad & Tobago
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